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A NEW POLITICAL ~CONOMY? 
Susan Rose-Ackerman* 
THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL 
CONSTITUTION. By Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 1980. Pp. xiv, 231. $22.50. 
The Power to Tax seeks to replace one economic orthodoxy with 
another. Despite their iconoclasm, Geoffrey Brennan and James 
Buchanan are closer to mainline public finance economists than they 
would like to admit. Both the dominant orthodoxy and The Power to 
Tax fail to transcend the limits of neoclassical economics as a formal 
theory of political economy. While their methods of evasion are dif-
ferent, both iconoclasts and mainliners fail to take seriously the dis-
tinctive features of modem democratic policies - elections, 
bureaucracy, and an ongoing effort at complex normative 
evaluation. 
I. TAX POLICY IN A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 
Before exploring these common limitations, however, it is impor-
tant to sketch the outlines of the controversy as the protagonists 
themselves understand it. The two schools of thought differ, above 
all, in defining the primary audience for their work. Mainline econ-
omists imagine themselves proffering advice to a benevolent ruler 
interested in economic efficiency and social justice. In contrast, 
J3rennan and Buchanan see themselves as critical observers of a gov-
ernment run by selfish men and women. They wish to write a fiscal 
constitution that effectively constrains the self-seeking behavior of 
politicians and bureaucrats. 
Consequently, Brennan and Buchanan's formal modeling of gov-
ernment begins from a radically different starting point than the 
more familiar orthodoxy. They assume a single monopolistic ruler 
("Leviathan") who tries to maximize the difference between revenue 
collected and money spent on public services ( or in a slightly more 
sophisticated version, who maximizes a utility function defined over 
public services and surplus revenue). The ruler is a "king" 
* Professor of Law and Political Economy, Columbia University. - Ed. 
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threatened with neither revolution nor electoral defeat and con-
strained only by a set of binding constitutional rules. The authors 
are rather diffident about this particular formulation, and take care 
to point out that their fundamental commitment is not to the details 
of their model, but to a view of politicians as essentially selfish. 
This basic point of view is a useful and much needed antidote to 
the standard perspective. Even the most sophisticated prescriptions 
of economic policy-makers may fail, not because they are wrong, but 
because they are distorted by the self-interest of politicians and bu-
reaucrats. The central theoretical question th~n becomes how this 
selfishness ought to enter the formal analysis. 1 It is here that Bren-
nan and Buchanan make a critical move. Because their government 
is a monopolistic Leviathan, they can draw heavily on an economic 
theory of monopoly that was never designed to confront the distinc-
tive characteristics of democratic politics. While the model is merely 
a working hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan do use it to generate 
some very specific conclusions. Since Leviathan seeks to maximize 
its net return, it wants to tax goods with inelastic supplies or q.e-
mands; it thinks that broad tax bases are better than narrow ones, 
and it prefers taxes that can carefully discriminate between taxpayers 
on the basis of willingness-to-pay. In short, Leviathan wants a basic 
tax system that is close to the ideal advanced by the standard econo-
mist interested in minimizing the "excess burden" of taxation and in 
tying taxes to the benefits of public services. 2 Both Leviathan and 
1. For related critiques, see Musgrave, Leviathan Cometh - Or .Does He?, in TAX AND 
EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS 77 (H. Ladd & T.N. Tideman eds.) (Urban Institute, COUPE 
Papers on Public Economics, No. 5, 1981); Oates, .Discussion of Musgrave and Brennan, in id. at 
139. These papers comment on Brennan, Tax Limits and the Logic of Constitutional Restric-
tions,in id. at 121. 
2. One branch of the optimal taxation literature has been entirely unconcerned with the 
benefits of public services. Instead, the task is to raise a fixed amount of revenue with the least 
distortion to the economy, i.e., with the minimum of excess burden. With elastic supplies, no 
income effects, and zero cross-elasticities of demand, tax rates should be set in inverse propor-
tion to the price elasticity of demand. In a general equilibrium framework, no such straight-
forward results are possible because the optimal rates also depend upon cross-elasticities and 
income effects. However, in the special case where the utility function is directly additive, the 
optimal tax rate is higher, the lower the income elasticity of demand (i.e., necessities should be 
taxed more heavily than luxuries). The relevant literature is summarized in A. ATKINSON & J 
STIGLITZ, EssAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 366-93 (1980). 
When production exhibits nonconstant returns to scale so that inframarginal firms earn 
profits, then the elasticity of supply is important. Ceteris paribus, the tax rate should be higher 
on inelastically supplied goods. See id. at 464-68. 
Another strand of public finance literature attempts to link taxes to individual benefits. 
Thus, in a Lindahl tax system, tax "prices" are set separately for each individual so that every-
one demands the same level of services. There have also been a few attempts to characterize 
the optimal level of public services when lump sum nondistortionary taxes are impossible. See 
id. at 482-97, 505-12. 
A final portion of the "optimal" taxation literature is concerned with the use of the tax and 
subsidy system for redistributive purposes. These models generally postulate one or another 
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the conventional economist seek tax bases that minimize citizens' 
ability to shift away from the tax, and both want to tailor taxes to 
individuals. Of course, their reasons for wanting such a system are 
very different. The proponent of "optimal" taxation hopes to raise 
revenue to minimize efficiency losses and to reflect differences in in-
dividual benefits from public goods. In contrast, Leviathan hopes to 
maximize revenue collections, or, in a more complex version, to 
maximize the difference between spending on public goods and 
taxes. Since Leviathan's interests are directly opposed to the inter-
ests of the bulk of the population, people who accept this selfish-
despot model would seek to constrain Leviathan constitutionally. 
They, like Brennan and Buchanan, would want to impose con-
straints that ensure an inefficient tax system to prevent an oppressive 
exercise of monopoly power. This kind of fiscal constitution would 
specify that taxes be levied on a narrowly defined base of elastically 
demanded goods and that rates be uniform across goods and 
people.3 
This neat reversal of the standard results is clever and disturbing, 
but it also shows that constitutional constraints of the kind proposed 
can have serious consequences for economic efficiency if, perchance, 
the ruler is not a greedy Leviathan. Indeed, one danger of the au-
thors' constitutional theory is that it will become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. A document written to give little leeway for public-
spirited behavior is likely to attract few "statesmen" into politics. 
The only people attracted to careers as civil servants or elected repre-
sentatives would be narrow opportunists who (almost by definition) 
would not find the constitutional constraints burdensome. Brennan 
and Buchanan, however, probably do not view this as a disadvan-
tage of their constititutional approach. In fact, they worry that tax 
limits do not go far enough to constrain decision-makers who care 
about other things besides their own private creature comforts: 
"constraints become much less effective, and may well be evaded, if 
the motive force behind governmental action is 'do-goodism.' The 
exogenously given social welfare function and design a tax system to fulfill this goal. I discuss 
this branch of the literature when I deal with Brennan and Buchanan's treatment of distribu-
tive issues. See note 10 inji'a and accompanying text. 
3. See chs. 3-5. As the authors point out, the analogy between a monopolist and a Levia-
than government is not exact because the government does use some proportion of its revenue 
to produce public services. Pp. 74-75. It is possible, therefore, that taxpayers might prefer the 
government to set different sales tax structures for different individuals rather than be required 
to set a uniform proportional tax on some good. Pp. 69-76. However, the authors point out 
that this case is likely to be of little practical importance since "the possibility of any enforce-
able and effective differentiation over quantities purchased would be limited to nonstorable 
co=odities." P. 76. 
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licentious sinners we can control; the saintly ascetics may destroy us" 
(p. 166). 
11. A REDUCTIONIST THEORY 
But have Brennan and Buchanan done more than parody the ad-
mitted inadequacies of the conventional economic wisdom - replac-
ing the benevolent despot with the selfish Leviathan? Even the na'ive 
observer of politics recognizes a richer reality. Rather than a mono-
lithic state, there is a multitude of political actors. Rather than pure 
selfishness, at least some political actors try to take normative ques-
tions seriously. These complex concerns are transformed into con-
crete policies by the distinctive institutions of modem representative 
democracy, where electoral politics coexist uneasily with bureau-
cratic implementation. 
How have Brennan and Buchanan managed to cut through these 
political realities to develop their drastically simplified model? It is 
useful to see their construct as the product of three related reduction-
ist arguments that narrow the focus of their inquiry. 
The first and most important reductionist argument is 
Buchanan's effort to deny the propriety of ongoing normative evalu-
ation in political life. Indeed, in The Limits to Liberty, 4 he made 
explicit his desire to avoid all talk of distributive justice. Instead, 
property rights are to be grounded in each person's "threat advan-
tage" under anarchy. People differ in tastes and capacities, and their 
threat advantages are determined by guessing what distribution 
would arise from violence, stealth, and cajolery in the absence of a 
government. For some unexplained reason, Buchanan calls this the 
"natural" distribution and bases his social contract on this 
foundation. 5 
Yet if property rights are appropriately based on private "threat 
advantages," why should they not also be based on public threats, 
the raw power of the government to do as it likes? Despite their 
efforts to avoid normative arguments, Brennan and Buchanan 
merely fail to justify their underlying normative premise. If they be-
lieve that private power is "good," or at least unchallengeable, they 
need a normative theory explaining why the state ought not to decide 
that some private threats are unjust. Their blindness is most evident 
in their failure to treat seriously the impact of concentrated private 
4. J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS TO LIBERTY (1975). 
5. Id. at 49-50. If a person's threat advantage changes over time, then the social contract 
should change to reflect this. Id. at 77. 
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power on government.6 In fact, all their modeling exercises implic-
itly assume perfectly competitive private markets, with no monopo-
listic concentration of wealth. 
This perspective makes it easy for the authors to adopt a very 
truncated view of day-to-day government. Despite their refusal to 
justify normatively the "natural" distribution of property rights, 
their constitutional theory nonetheless tries to ensure that this distri-
bution remains sacrosanct. Once the distribution of property has 
been fixed by the constitution, the only legitimate function of gov-
ernment is the correction of externalities and the production of 
goods that cannot be efficiently provided by private markets. The 
practical difficulty here is to design a political system that keeps the 
distributive issues involved in setting up property rights separate 
from the system of taxing and spending. It seems extremely unlikely 
that such a division can be maintained, especially where constitu-
tionally protected rights depend upon the relative advantages of var-
ious people under anarchy. A system based on threat advantage 
seems inherently unstable. People would always be trying to im-
prove their status to give them a perceived advantage under anarchy. 
If, however, one ignores the possibility of continuing governmen-
tal instability as threat advantages are redefined, the authors' narrow 
view of the function of taxation permits them to make a second re-
ductionist move: electoral constraints have no particular legitimacy. 
If redistribution were a legitimate tax objective, political power 
could not be based only on the distribution of private property. In-
stead, it might seem sensible to use a relatively egalitarian voting 
system to decide how inegalitarian the property system ought to be. 
It would then be impossible to consider tax policy without taking 
redistribution through democratic politics seriously. In contrast, 
Brennan and Buchanan wish to protect the "natural" distribution of 
property based on threat advantage by insisting that unanimity is the 
ideal voting rule.7 This effectively limits the government to projects 
that will make everyone better off- all taxes are "benefit taxes" tied 
to each individual's gains from particular public policies. Since, as a 
6. C.f. Rae, Tlze Limits of Consensual .Decision, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1270, 1292, 1293-94 
(1975). Rae considers J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962), 
along with other theories based on consent. ''The doctrine [of consent] has grown subtler, but 
retains the mark of its birth: a single-minded attention to public power and a corresponding 
inattention to its alternatives." Rae, supra at 1293. See generally Goldberg, Institutional 
Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 461 (1974). 
7. The belief that unanimity is the best voting system in an ideal world is also held by more 
conventional public finance economists. Thus, Musgrave, supra note I, at 112, in a critique of 
Brennan and Buchanan's theory, writes that "budgeting by unanimous agreement would be 
ideal if there were no difficulty in securing the revelation of preferences." 
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practical matter, unanimity cannot be used for day-to-day political 
choices, Brennan and Buchanan are willing to compromise their 
ideal. Nevertheless, they wish to structure government to prevent 
redistribution through democratic politics: "[T]o the extent that the 
constitution lays down private property rights and laws against inter-
ference with those rights, these laws must be interpreted and en-
forced essentially independently of in-period politics" (p. 18). 
The third reduction follows naturally. Since majoritarian judg-
ments have no special legitimacy, it does not seem important to con-
sider carefully how they might constrain the behavior of elected 
officials and bureaucrats. In fact, the authors go so far as to claim 
that "majoritarian rule can best be modeled as if it embodies no ef-
fective constraint on the exercise of government powers at off' (p. 7). 
Although Brennan and Buchanan do not like the possibility for re-
distribution inherent in majority rule, this does not mean that voting 
processes impose no constraints. They simply impose constraints 
which Brennan and Buchanan do not like. 8 While Buchanan has 
stressed the importance of institutional design in other writings,9 The 
Power to Tax relegates such issues to the periphery. 
After depriving politics of redistributional content, after denying 
majoritarian voting any special legitimacy, after ignoring the power 
of institutional constraints on politicians and bureaucrats, The Power 
to Tax is left with a stark picture of Leviathan - intent only on 
using taxation to rip off the citizenry. But this model can be no bet-
ter than the three reductionist premises on which it is based. 
Ill. TOWARD A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The inadequacies of The Power to Tax should not lead one to 
dismiss its powerful critique of mainstream public finance. Indeed, 
when compared with mainstream theorists, the authors are relatively 
sophisticated about government. At least they self-consciously rec-
ognize that their Leviathan is an oversimplification of political real-
ity, and make some effort to justify their reductionist premises. In 
contrast, conventional public finance has all too often embraced sim-
ilar assumptions without finding it necessary to justify them at all. 
While the dominant tradition assumes a benevolent government, it is 
8. Brennan and Buchanan, pp. 173-84, do discuss the advantages of a federal system with 
competitive state and local government, but they fail to emphasize the costs of such competi-
tion when it results in beggar-thy-neighbor policies. For a critique of multiple models of gov-
ernment, see Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local 
Government in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES (P. Mieszkowski & G. Zodrow eds. 
1982) (forthcoming). 
9. See especially the second half of J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 6. 
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no more interested in complex normative arguments than Brennan 
and Buchanan. Instead, it attempts to assess the "optimality" of a 
tax by postulating the existence of an exogenously fixed "social wel-
fare function." 10 This technique makes it possible for mainstream 
economists to function as skilled technicians, unconcerned with the 
messy complexity of democratic politics. If they think about govern-
ment at all, they view political and bureaucratic practices as unfortu-
nate constraints upon a benevolent despot interested in overall 
efficiency, full employment, and growth - interested, in short, in 
listening to technically competent economic advice. 11 
But it is possible to do better than this. While there may have 
been a time when philosophers themselves despaired of contributing 
to political argument, 12 today's error may well be overconfidence. 
John Rawls' work13 has had the most impact on normative economic 
analysis, probably because economists can reduce it to the simple 
10. This is done in spite of the fact that a pluralistic society is unlikely to be able to agree 
on a social welfare function. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 
(1951). Such research postulates a social welfare function that might, for example, be "Rawl-
sian," utilitarian, or egalitarian, and then examines the tax implications of this choice. See A. 
ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 394-423; Cooter & Helpman, Optimal Taxation far 
Transfer Payments, 88 Q.J. EcoN. 656 (1974). Cooter and Helpman write: "Optimal tax rates 
for redistribution must be obtained through maximization of a social welfare function." Id. at 
656. They then examine the implications for tax policy of seven alternative welfare goals. 
Their "democratic" welfare function merely maximizes the utility of the class of median abil-
ity, id. at 658, and ignores all the difficulties of majoritarian political procedures. 
11. Atkinson and Stiglitz in their graduate public economics text, A. ATKINSON & J. STIG• 
LITZ, supra note 2, spend only one of their eighteen lectures on theories of the state. Id. at 294-
330. However, in their concluding lecture they do call for a return to "political economy." Id. 
at 576. 
Of course, Brennan and Buchanan are not the only economists to criticize research in 
mainstream public finance. Early work by Downs, A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY (1957), has been followed in recent years by a growth in the field of public 
choice. For a review of the literature, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). It remains 
true, however, that this work has had surprisingly little impact on work by public finance 
economists. For one exception, see Aumann & Kurz, Power and Taxes, 45 EcoNOMETRICA 
1137 (1977). 
In the study of public regulation and public policy, however, the political economic ap-
proach is of growing importance in developing positive theories of government behavior. See, 
e.g., Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); 
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974); Stigler, 
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sc1. 3 (1971). 
12. This was apparently a widely held view in the fifties and sixties. See PHILOSOPHY, 
Pouncs AND SOCIETY (P. Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979). In the introduction, id. at 2, the 
editors quote Isaiah Berlin: 
"No commanding work of political theory has appeared in the 20th century." So said 
Isaiah Berlin, writing in 1962 in the second volume of Philosophy, Politics and Sociel)' in 
answer to the question .Does Political Theory Still Exist? He was taking up a point made 
six years earlier in the introduction to the first volume. The outstanding oifference now, 
in 1978, is that Berlin's assertions no longer are true. 
13. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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formula: "Maximize the position of the worst off class."I4 Books by 
Robert NozickI5 and Bruce Ackerman,I6 as well as a flood of more 
narrowly focused articles in journals like Ethics and Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, indicate the continuing vitality of the field. More-
over, much of this work can be used to enrich research in theoretical 
welfare economics and public choice. The task is to make use of 
these normative arguments without reducing them to conventional 
Bergsonian social welfare functions. I7 
The existence of this continuing philosophical debate makes a 
point that transcends the ideas of any particular political theorist. 
Just as philosophers do not agree on the proper distribution of 
wealth and power, neither will ordinary citizens. And if no status 
quo or benchmark distribution is widely accepted, procedural fair-
ness becomes an important element of constitutional design. Even if 
the constitution writers do not believe that they can legitimately im-
pose their own view of the best substantive distribution, the political 
procedures that they establish will have implications for the future 
development of property rights and the distribution of wealth. I8 
Our collective inability to agree on a fair distribution of property 
rights may well provide the strongest argument for an egalitarian 
distribution of voting power. By severing the distribution of votes 
from the distribution of property, a democratic state can symbolize -
the problematic character of any existing property distribution. The 
one person-one vote principle, moreover, captures what appears to 
be a widely held notion of fair process. Thus, one test of the legiti-
macy of an inegalitarian system of property rights may be its capac-
ity to gain the ongoing support of an egalitarian political system. 
As long as there is private inequality, there will be a tension be-
tween the procedural equality of an idealized political system and 
the substantive inequality of material resources. This makes the 
study of political corruption, broadly conceived, a matter of central 
importance: How insulated should the political system be from the 
private property system? Rather than making some intuitive distinc-
14. Rawls himself would, however, be unlikely to accept such an oversimplified caricature 
of his work. 
15. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). 
16. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). 
17. See Bergson, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics, 52 Q.J. ECON. 
314 (1938); Bergson, On the Concept of Social Welfare, 68 Q.J. EcoN. 233 (1954). 
18. Interestingly, this basic point of view with its emphasis on procedure is close to 
Buchanan's own position except that he takes no position in favor of equality. He writes, ''The 
'goodness' ofan outcome is evaluated on procedural criteria applied to the means of its attain-
ment and not on substantive criteria intrinsic to such outcomes." J. BUCHANAN, supra note 4, 
at 164. 
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tion between outright bribery and more indirect uses of wealth to 
influence votes, the normative challenge is to define "corruption" by 
explaining why the exercise of private power can be inconsistent 
with fair democratic process. 19 Even if one can define "corrupt" 
practices with the aid of such a theory, a second question remains for 
empirical analysis. Given a normative theory that permits a rela-
tively small role for private wealth in politics, it is still possible that 
the wealthy may gain influence over time - permitting them to 
achieve a legislative redefinition of corruption that increasingly fa-
vors their interest. Systematic analysis of this possibility could pro-
vide a rigorous theoretical framework for the constitutional debate 
surrounding Buckley v. Valeo 20 and campaign finance reform. 
But it is not enough to insulate political choice effectively from 
the inegalitarian distribution of private wealth and power. It re-
mains to define the procedures through which the preferences of in-
dividual citizens are aggregated into political choice. Majority rule 
has frequently been accepted, especially by constitutional lawyers,21 
as a self-evidently desirable, egalitarian procedure. A major contri-
bution of social choice theory, however, has been simultaneously to 
illuminate and to undercut the foundations of this belief. 
A landmark result in formal social choice theory gave majoritari-
anism conceptual support by transforming our vague normative in-
tuitions about majority rule into a precise formulation. In 1952, 
K.O. May22 established a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for majority rule that have substantial normative force. May showed 
that majority rule was the only rule that satisfies a set of four axioms. 
The first two require that the voting procedure be neutral with re-
spect to options and anonymous with respect to voters. His neutral-
ity axiom requires that no option be favored ( or disfavored) more 
than any other. Thus, there can be no status quo or benchmark posi-
tion that plays a special role. Brennan and Buchanan's ideal proce-
dure, which requires unanimous consent before a change can be 
made, obviously does not satisfy "neutrality." May's requirement of 
anonymity, in tum, implies that no voter is more favored than any 
other. One must be able to rename the voters with no change in the 
outcome. In short, these two axioms require that both options and 
individuals be treated symmetrically. If one believes that distribu-
19. See S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978), 
20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
21. E.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
22. May,A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions far Simple Majoril)' .De-
cision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952). 
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tive issues are at the heart of politics, such an egalitarian bias seems, 
at least prima fade, a fair starting point. 
The two other axioms require the procedure to be "decisive" and 
"positively responsive." A decisive procedure is simply one that can 
rank any two alternatives no matter what the preferences of the vot-
ers happen to be. For two options, X and Y, it will tell us either that 
X is socially preferred to Y, Y is preferred to X, or X and Y are 
indifferent. Notice that neither a rule requiring less than majority 
support nor a rule requiring more than majority support is decisive, 
taken by itself. Thus a rule stating that one option is socially pre-
ferred to another if at least forty percent of the people prefer the first 
to the second is not decisive if forty percent prefer X to Y while sixty 
percent prefer Y to X. Alternatively, if sixty percent support is re-
quired for passage, the rule would be unable to decide between X 
and Y if fifty-five percent preferred X and forty-five percent prefer-
red Y. The sixty percent rule could be made decisive by fixing one 
option as a status quo that persists unless a new proposal obtains 
over sixty percent of the votes, but this added condition would vio-
late neutrality. 
"Positive responsiveness" is a strong condition, but it seems con-
sistent with liberal democratic principles. This axiom asserts that if 
society is indifferent between two options, X and Y, and if X goes up 
in someone's preference relative to Y, and does not fall in anyone 
else's, then X must be socially preferred to Y. Basically, this condi-
tion means that the decision rule cannot have large ranges of social 
indifference unless most individuals are actually indifferent between 
many options. For example, it rules out a social choice procedure in 
which society declares itself to be indifferent between all efficient 
points.23 
May's achievement was to show that these axioms are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for majority rule. Anyone who finds these 
axioms desirable on normative grounds must choose majority rule as 
the social choice procedure.24 
Whatever the appeal of May's axioms, they do not guarantee the 
existence of a unique majority winner. When there are three or 
more options, majority rule may not yield a determinate outcome 
unless the range of individual preference pattepis falls into a restric-
tive class. Suppose society must choose one of three options, X, Y, 
23. The axiom also rules out a procedure in which X if socially preferred to Y if more than 
60% of the voters prefer X to Y; X is indifferent to Y if from 40% to 60% prefer X; and Y is 
·preferred to X if more than 60% prefer Y to X. 
24. See A.K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 56-70 (1970). 
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and Z, and that it votes by majority rule on each pair to find the 
option that defeats all others. Then it is possible for Y to beat X, Z 
to beat Y, and X to beat Z. The system continuously cycles. The 
only way out is to fix the order of voting ahead of time and stop after 
three pairwise votes. The individual with the power to set the 
agenda then clearly has the power to determine the outcome.25 
This difficulty with majority rule has led analysts to consider 
other voting methods that avoid this problem. Each one, however, 
has its own anomalies and hard cases. Point voting systems, for ex-
ample, in which voters allocate a fixed number of points over all 
options, with the high scorer winning, are subject to strategic manip-
ulation.26 In fact, recent work by Gibbard and Satterthwaite has 
shown that no plausible choice procedure is strategy-proof.27 Rather 
than despairing in the face of such results, however, political econo-
mists should use them to begin a conversation with constitutional 
lawyers, whose discussions of majority rule have failed to take social 
choice theory seriously. At the very least, a clear statement of the 
problems of majoritarian procedures will force constitutional law-
yers to re-examine their oversimplified majoritarian rhetoric. Per-
haps the best way to begin this discussion is to focus on particular 
systems that avoid a close connection between skillful political ma-
nipulation and high levels of private wealth and power. Brennan 
and Buchanan do nothing to aid this process by assuming these is-
sues out of existence. 
Yet even if political economists took this step, a final task would 
remain. It is not enough to insulate democratic politics from the un-
due influence of private power. Constitutional analysis must take 
seriously the characteristic institutions of a modem representative, 
bureaucratic state. These are not details that can be conveniently 
25. Voting cycles are clearly discussed in A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL 
CHOICE 161-77 (1980). 
26. A useful discussion of the problems with alternative voting rules is found in Niemi & 
Riker, The Choice oJ Voting Systems, Sci. AM., June 1976, at 21. 
27. See A. FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 195-215, for a discussion and annotated bibliogra-
phy. The theorem, proved separately by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, deals with social decision 
functions (SDFs) that associate a single social choice with each pattern of individual prefer-
ences. The theorem supposes that we want a SDF to satisfy four conditions. These conditions 
are 
1) Universality, ie., any preference profile over the alternatives is admissible; 
2) Nondictatorship, ie., no person can determine the social choice irrespective of others' 
preferences; 
. 3) Nondegeneracy, ie., the choice rule is not completely independent of people's prefer-
ences; and 
4) Nonmanipulability or cheatproofness, ie., no one finds it in his interest to misrepresent 
his preferences to gain an advantage. 
Gibbard and Satterthwaite show that no SDF satisfies these four conditions. 
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assumed away, but are the necessary result of operating a democracy 
in a large country facing complex technological, economic, social, 
and political problems. The most fundamental difficulty is the lim-
ited time and information available to the citizenry. Authority must 
be delegated to others if government is to function at all efficiently. 
Of course, with delegation comes the potential for abuse - with a 
Leviathan government representing the extreme of self-interested be-
havior by public servants. One must ask, however, whether institu-
tional or procedural constraints can substitute for Brennan and 
Buchanan's substantive constitutional limits and prohibitions. A 
necessary institutional check, of course, is provided by regular, con-
tested elections. Greedy and corrupt politicians can be voted out of 
office when they seek re-election, but this will only happen if voters 
know something about the behavior of elected representatives and if 
corruption is viewed with disfavor. Elections would do little to en-
sure honest government if politicians merely used their bribe money 
to purchase votes.28 Even in less extreme cases where elections are 
conducted honestly, voters may simply be ignorant of politicians' be-
havior. Brennan and Buchanan's vision of Leviathan reflects reality 
most accurately when government officials have a monopoly on in-
formation about themselves. The procedural approach would, there-
fore, require the constitution to guarantee the right of journalists, 
scholars, and ordinary citizens to find out how government is work-
ing. Indeed, it may be possible to construct plausible models in 
which som~ institutions, such as the media, have special rights to 
monitor government in the name of democratic values.29 
Ordinary citizens may be ineffective in constraining politicians, 
not only because of poor information, but also because of the costs-of 
organizing for political action. Some analysts, most notably Mancur 
Olson,30 argue that political participation will be too low because of 
"free riding." Citizens with limited time and energy may not find it 
worthwhile to organize to lobby for public goods or to monitor offi-
cials because they hope to benefit from the political action under-
taken by others. As a consequence, very few individuals will 
participate in politics, and public services will be ''undersupplied." 
Olson's position, however, implies that politicians will have substan-
tial freedom of action. Therefore, if other groups besides rank and 
28. For a further development of these ideas in the context of campaign financing and 
legislative corruption, see S. RosE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at chs. 2-4. 
29. The courts have not given the press a constitutionally privileged right to information, 
but a recent case did assert the public's constitutional right to information about judicial pro-
ceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
30. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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file voters lobby for particular policies, it is possible for public serv-
ices to be "oversupplied." In particular, a professional bureaucracy, 
charged with carrying out the laws, can have an independent policy-
making role. Theories of "bureaucratic aggrandizement" claim that 
bureaucrats with a monopoly over information and expertise will try 
to generate large budgets for their agencies and will collude with 
elected officials for their mutual benefit.31 
Taken together, the "free rider" and "bureaucratic aggrandize-
ment" theories suggest a more complex judgment of governmental 
performance than Brennan and Buchanan's analysis permits. 
Rather than a Leviathan single-mindedly maximizing its own wel-
fare, political economy can yield no a priori judgment about whether 
government will be ''too large" or "too small." What is required is a 
series of studies of how different kinds of imperfect information and 
alternative organizational structures affect the composition of the 
budget and the scope of public regulation.32 It is only in this way 
that the constitutionalist can hope to control the uses of specialized 
.knowledge that are critical in the drafting and administration of 
complex modem legislation. 
* * * 
Brennan and Buchanan are right to call for a new political econ-
omy, but they are wrong in describing its purpose. Rather than mak-
ing politics safe for private property, the aim should be to 
understand the distinctive character of the modem democratic state. 
This project has already been begun by both economists and polit-
ical scientists, and The Power to Tax should not be allowed to deter-
mine the agenda for future discussion between political economists 
and constitutional lawyers. 
31. See R.D. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY (1979); w. NISKANEN, BU-
REAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); Fiorina & Noll, Voters, Legislators 
and Bureaucracy: Institutional JJesign in the Public Sector, 68 AM. EcoN. REV. - PAPERS & 
PRoc. 256 (1978). J. BucHANAN, supra note 4, at 156-61 also raises these issues. 
32. See, e.g., M. Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Author-
ity (Paper Prepared for the Conference on Social Science and Regulatory Policy, sponsored by 
the Regulation Program of the National Science Foundation, Reston, Va., Jan. 22-23, 1982). 
High-level bureaucrats and elected politicians are not, however, the only public officials 
with monopoly power. Low-level bureaucrats who deal directly with the public or with private 
firms also can grant favors, apply sanctions, and generally make life easy or difficult for citi-
zens. Regimes that grant many people petty monopoly power over various aspects of life can 
be oppressive even if elections are frequent and basic rights are guaranteed. Here structural 
reforms that introduce more competition between bureaucrats, convert more regulatory 
processes into market-like transactions, and permit appeals to higher levels can reduce monop-
oly power without restricting government's ability to act to correct private market failures and 
redistribute income. See S. RosE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, chs. 5-9. 
